Hannes Tschofenig
2016-08-03 07:50:31 UTC
Hi Mike, Phil, Tony,
I have read through draft-ietf-oauth-amr-values-01. My earlier comments
have been addressed.
As a shepherd I nevertheless have a few questions/remarks:
1) The term 'multiple-channel authentication' is unfamiliar to me.
Could you give me an example or a reference to a specification?
2) PIN: The use of RFC 2119 language appears to be inappropriate.
3) Could you explain me what 'risk-based authentication' is? While you
provided a reference
4) Could we generalize the term 'wia' to operating systems other than
Windows as well?
5) I am not sure whether all normative references indeed need to be
declared as such.
For example, 'otp' is defined in a very generic fashion but you list
HTOP, and TOTP as normative references.
I would rather see HTOP and TOTP as a standardized examples of
one-time-passwords. IMHO the story would be different if you indeed want
to differentiate between the different technical mechanisms itself. This
is a reasonable approach as well if the security differences between the
mechanisms is important for the given application.
Ciao
Hannes
I have read through draft-ietf-oauth-amr-values-01. My earlier comments
have been addressed.
As a shepherd I nevertheless have a few questions/remarks:
1) The term 'multiple-channel authentication' is unfamiliar to me.
Could you give me an example or a reference to a specification?
2) PIN: The use of RFC 2119 language appears to be inappropriate.
3) Could you explain me what 'risk-based authentication' is? While you
provided a reference
4) Could we generalize the term 'wia' to operating systems other than
Windows as well?
5) I am not sure whether all normative references indeed need to be
declared as such.
For example, 'otp' is defined in a very generic fashion but you list
HTOP, and TOTP as normative references.
I would rather see HTOP and TOTP as a standardized examples of
one-time-passwords. IMHO the story would be different if you indeed want
to differentiate between the different technical mechanisms itself. This
is a reasonable approach as well if the security differences between the
mechanisms is important for the given application.
Ciao
Hannes