requirements in the security considerations section. Some like them, as
some donât like them, preferring all normative material be in the âbodyâ of
the spec itself. I was given the impression that it was more of a stylistic
choice than anything, but I can only speak from my personal experience.
(8.2). That requirement could be moved to the body of the doc, while
considerations. To me the remaining text are indeed security best
practices / clarifications.
Section like RFC7591. I always assumed these were best-practice security
requirements. But if the style is really not to do this, the requirement
BCP.
Post by DenisI *don't thin**k* it's normal to have normative text in the Security
Considerations, hence I support Samuel's position.
Let us look at the first MUST from RFC 6749 in the Security
The authorization server *MUST *authenticate the client *whenever possible*.
The authorization server *should *authenticate the client whenever possible.
RFC 6749 is not an example to follow.
Denis
I do think it's normal to have normative text in the Security
Considerations. RFC6749 has a lengthy Security Considerations section
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-10> with a lot of normative
text.
Think of it this way: Sections 4 to 7 describe how to use native app URI
schemes to perform OAuth flows from the app to browser and back. If you
only read those sections, you could have a functioning (but potentially
insecure) OAuth flow in a native app. The security section adds some
security requirements and clarifications for implementing Sections 4-7,
like using PKCE, and more.
8.1 Definitely belongs here, as the the whole BCP is about native-app URI
schemes, whereas doing OAuth in a WebView doesn't need those (as the client
can just pluck out the code from any redirect URI)
8.2 Requires that servers who want to follow the native apps BCP support
PKCE, and recommends that they reject requests from clients who don't.
This *could* be in the main doc, but since PKCE is an existing thing, and
is purely additive from a security perspective, I think this reference
works fine. Originally I talked about PKCE more in the doc body, but some
reviewers thought it was then a little duplicative of the PKCE doc itself.
8.3 This reads like classic security considerations to me, clarifying some details of 7.3
8.4 Part of this reads a little new-ish, regarding distinguishing native
clients from web ones. But on review, I think could just be re-worded to
reference RFC6749 Section 2.1.
8.5 This one belongs where it is since the body of the BCP is talking
about the code flow.
8.6 Totally belongs.
8.7 to 8.11 belong IMO, they are security clarifications of long-standing topics.
My methodology when reviewing this was: is the text introducing a new
topic directly related to native apps or sections 4-7, or does it discuss
an old security topic in the context of native apps, or add security
related discussions of the content in 4-7. Of all those, I really only see
a bit of new topic related to native apps in 8.4, and in actual fact it
that sub-section should probably be reworded since RFC6749 already
establishes the public client type, which native apps are and a reference
would be more appropriate (which would reduce it to just clarifying an old
topic).
What do you think of this analysis? Do you have any specific sections or
text you feel are better suited in the document body? I will take an
action item to revise section 8.4.
Post by Samuel ErdtmanHi,
I just had a question on best practice. In this document a large part of
the normative text is located under Security Considerations.
I had previously seen Security Considerations as things to think about
when implementing not so much as MUSTs and MUST NOTs.
I think it is okay to have it this way but it surprised me a bit and
wanted to ask if there is any best practice for the Security Considerations
section saying what type of information it should include.
Best Regards
Samuel Erdtman
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