Well - first of all that it uses all the recommend validation techniques
- state validation + protection
- nonce validation
- at_hash validation
- identity token validation
- discovery
+ solid and tested JS code
I donât see extra value for a JS client in things like âsigned requestsâ -
as I said before - at the end of the day the access token will end up in
the browser. Regardless how secure you made the authentication request in
the first place.
-------
Dominick Baier
Post by Dominick BaierGiven a solid client library for JS, I think implicit flow is OK to use.
If you can, can you dig deeper here? What is it about this particular
library that makes its use of the OAuth 2 implicit flow secure? Signed
messages? Only supports registered clients? Something else?
Aloha, Jim
On 2/17/17 8:02 AM, Dominick Baier wrote:
Given a solid client library for JS, I think implicit flow is OK to use.
But I agree that there are many âhome grownâ implementation out there that
are not secure - and the necessary JS code to write a good client is not
necessarily the âpit of successâ.
You should give this lib a go (itâs also a certified RP):
https://github.com/IdentityModel/oidc-client-js
Many people argue that handling the protocol and crypto pieces in JS is
problematic (and I agree if no proper lib is used for that) - but at then
end of the day the access token will end up in the browser - and a sloppy
developer (e.g. not using CSP) will always write bad code that might lead
to leaking a token.
-------
Dominick Baier
On 17 February 2017 at 18:43:25, Adam Lewis (
***@motorolasolutions.com) wrote:
+1000
We are currently going through internal turmoil over the usage of implicit
grant for ua-based apps. The webapp case is well understood and the WG has
work in progress to define best practices for native apps. Having one for
ua-based apps would be HUGELY beneficial
Post by Dominick BaierThank you to those answering my question on implicit for JS clients.
The responses so far seem to represent what the security world is saying
about the implicit grant - keep away from it other than for a few OIDC use
cases.
Does anyone think it would be valuable to author a brief RFC to give clear
OAuth 2 recommendations for JavaScript client developers?
I mean - the OAuth 2 body of work just needs a few more RFC's, right? :)
Aloha, Jim
Same for Deutsche Telekom. Our javascript clients also use code flow with
CORS processing and of course redirect_uri validation.
Best regards
Sebastian
Auftrag von* Bill Burke
*Gesendet:* Freitag, 17. Februar 2017 00:14
*Betreff:* Re: [OAUTH-WG] Google's use of Implicit Grant Flow
For our IDP [1], our javascript library uses the auth code flow, but
requires a public client, redirect_uri validation, and also does CORS
checks and processing. We did not like Implicit Flow because
1) access tokens would be in the browser history
2) short lived access tokens (seconds or minutes) would require a browser redirect
I'd be really curious to hear other's thoughts though.
[1] http://keycloak.org
<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__keycloak.org&d=DwMD-g&c=q3cDpHe1hF8lXU5EFjNM_A&r=hS3A5qzQnW1hxYBhPrxNW10ESeDiiiRwR8H84JHIXTI&m=IfM1P0zp986kOQNk7-NwlgfRZMq5MppK0kISXhIOF_s&s=YExyuyZO5YNpSvS3mEUG5pjKAjRXXVT8Xvk8hIb-Efw&e=>
Hello Folks,
I noticed that Google supports the OAuth 2 Implicit flow for third-party
JavaScript applications.
https://developers.google.com/identity/protocols/OAuth2UserAgent
<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__developers.google.com_identity_protocols_OAuth2UserAgent&d=DwMD-g&c=q3cDpHe1hF8lXU5EFjNM_A&r=hS3A5qzQnW1hxYBhPrxNW10ESeDiiiRwR8H84JHIXTI&m=IfM1P0zp986kOQNk7-NwlgfRZMq5MppK0kISXhIOF_s&s=_Mig-zmCt1y9dZpCece1dqby3VmcZVOu2JPcmAwzwKU&e=>
Isn't this generally discouraged from a security POV? *Is there a better
OAuth 2 flow for third party SPA applications?*
Aloha,
--
Jim Manico
Manicode Security
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Jim Manico
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